
Most acquirers, and nearly all U.S. strategic buyers, want 100% of the target. A single minority shareholder who refuses to sell, or simply stops responding, can derail the deal. The drag-along clause (obligation de sortie forcée) allows a qualified majority of shareholders to require the others to sell their shares to the same buyer on the same terms.
This guide explains how drag-along clauses work in French companies, which protections minorities negotiate and how the clause is enforced, with the points Romain Waiss-Moreau addresses on cross-border exits.
If shareholders holding a defined percentage accept an offer for all of the company's shares, every other shareholder undertakes to sell to the same buyer, on the same terms. French law has no statutory squeeze-out for private companies, so the mechanism is contractual: each shareholder grants a unilateral promise to sell in favour of the majority, or of the buyer they designate.
| Term | Issue | Common outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Trigger threshold | Who can force a sale | Qualified majority, often 60 to 75% of the shares |
| Class consent | Avoid forcing a class against its will | Majority within each preferred class |
| Minimum price | Protect against a low-priced sale | Minimum multiple of investment or floor valuation |
| Consideration | Cash or buyer shares | Cash, or securities with a cash alternative |
| Timing | When the clause can be used | After a protection period of several years |
Minority funds often negotiate a price floor guaranteeing a minimum return, or a veto during the first years. Founders ensure that a single investor cannot force a sale.
Romain Waiss-Moreau drafts the drag-along and the related powers so that closing can proceed without going to court.
| Criterion | Tag-along | Drag-along |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | Right of minorities | Obligation of minorities |
| Who decides | Each beneficiary | A qualified majority |
| Purpose | Avoid staying with a new controlling shareholder | Deliver 100% to a buyer |
| Main protection | Same terms as the seller | Minimum price, limited warranties |
A U.S. strategic buyer offers to acquire 100% of a French startup at a price approved by 92% of shareholders. An angel holding 3% has stopped responding for months. The agreement provided for a 75% drag-along threshold and an irrevocable power of attorney allowing the president to sign transfer forms for any defaulting shareholder. The sale closed on schedule, and the angel's proceeds were placed in escrow. Without the power of attorney, closing would have waited for court proceedings. The firm treats this power as an essential part of any drag-along clause, especially when the buyer is American and expects a clean 100% closing.
The price paid by the buyer is allocated under the waterfall, not simply pro rata to shares. Dragged shareholders should be able to check the allocation: agreements usually require the distribution schedule to be shared before completion.
Yes, that is its purpose, provided its conditions are met and its use does not amount to an abuse of majority, such as a sale engineered to the detriment of minorities.
It usually sits in the shareholders' agreement. Reflecting it in the SAS bylaws, for example through a compulsory transfer clause, strengthens enforcement against any new shareholder.
Yes, if the clause allows it. Minority shareholders often ask for a cash alternative, and securities law requirements for issuing U.S. shares to French holders must be checked.
Unexercised BSPCE follow the plan, which should provide for accelerated exercise or lapse on a sale. Once exercised, the shares are subject to the drag-along if the holder has joined the shareholders' agreement.
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