
U.S. investors are used to preferred stock with a 1x non-participating liquidation preference as the market standard. The same economics exist in France, through actions de préférence (preferred shares) issued by an SAS or SA. The concept travels well; the drafting does not always, because French law requires the rights to be set out in the bylaws and tested against rules such as the prohibition of leonine clauses.
This guide explains French preferred shares, the mechanics of the 1x preference and its variants, with worked examples. It flags the points Romain Waiss-Moreau addresses when U.S. term sheets are implemented in French companies.
Under Articles L. 228-11 et seq. of the French Commercial Code, a joint-stock company can issue shares with special rights of any kind: liquidation preference, priority dividend, enhanced or no voting rights, information rights, anti-dilution protection. They are created by extraordinary shareholders' decision, generally on the report of a special auditor when they benefit named persons, and their rights must be described in the bylaws. SARLs cannot issue preferred shares.
On a liquidity event (sale, merger, liquidation), the preferred holder first receives one times its investment before the remaining proceeds are shared.
Example: an investor has invested €2 million for 20% of the company.
| Exit price | Non-participating: investor | Non-participating: others | Participating: investor | Participating: others |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| €3m | €2m | €1m | €2.2m | €0.8m |
| €5m | €2m | €3m | €2.6m | €2.4m |
| €20m | €4m | €16m | €5.6m | €14.4m |
With a non-participating preference, the protection matters only in disappointing exits. With a participating preference, the investor takes more at every exit price.
Romain Waiss-Moreau models the distribution under several exit scenarios before signing, and ensures the U.S. term sheet translates accurately into French bylaws.
| Right | Effect | Frequency in venture deals |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidation preference | Priority on exit proceeds | Almost always |
| Broad-based weighted average anti-dilution | Adjusts entry price in a down round | Common |
| Full ratchet anti-dilution | Resets entry price to the down-round price | Rare, very founder-unfriendly |
| Class voting rights | Consent required for certain decisions | Common |
| Priority dividend | Priority on distributions | Rare in startups |
| Conversion | Into ordinary shares, notably on an IPO | Always |
A startup receives two offers for the same €3 million investment. The first values the company at €12 million pre-money with a 1x participating preference; the second at €10 million pre-money with a 1x non-participating preference. On a €25 million exit, founders receive more under the second offer despite the lower valuation, because participation in the first offer more than offsets the valuation gap. The firm runs this comparison before founders choose their lead investor.
By an extraordinary shareholders' decision amending the bylaws to describe the new class. When issued to named persons, a special auditor reports on the particular benefits. Any later change to the rights requires the consent of the special meeting of the holders of that class.
Yes, when it organises the order of distribution without excluding any shareholder from all profits. Careful drafting remains necessary.
They can, under conditions set in the bylaws, for example automatically on an IPO or at the holder's option. Conversion terms must be specified at issuance.
Yes, by an extraordinary decision of all shareholders and a decision of the special meeting of the relevant preferred holders, which means their consent is needed.
It protects the investor if the company later raises at a lower valuation, by granting additional shares to offset all or part of the drop. The broad-based weighted average version is the most common and the most balanced.
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